Generally speaking, we expect modest growth, specifically a quarterly rate of 0.1%. The situation is still very much influenced by the counter-movement to the rise in the first and second quarters. Interestingly, this was mainly driven by Ireland, which means we need to keep a close eye on Ireland again. Momentum is low in Germany, France and Italy. Spain is still the exception, but we are seeing a slowdown there too. Surveys suggest that the fourth quarter will also be subdued. The real impact of the trade distortions caused by US tariffs is yet to come.

Tourism is not even the main driver. Spain is more comparable to the US: there was a lot of activity in 2024, driven by immigration. This was due to relaxations in immigration laws, for example. Foreigners who have studied in Spain can now take up employment more easily. There was a lot of immigration into the service sector, particularly from Latin America. This has supported consumer momentum in the country – not on a per capita basis, but many people ultimately generate a lot of consumption. Added to this is the tourism industry, which in turn benefits from immigration in the service sector. And then there is the investment momentum generated by the Covid fund, which is being accelerated by the relocation of production to Spain.

Companies from core Europe in particular. This is because wages and energy costs in Spain are comparatively low, yet energy security remains high.

The important question here is not only how high my own tariffs are, but also where my competitors' tariffs are. You can be happy if you are below them. But that's only half the story. Because this gives competitors a stronger incentive to relocate parts of their production to the US. If they do so, you have to follow suit. That's exactly the problem most companies are facing right now: they don't know what the best strategy is.

Not all aspects of the deal have been finalised yet, such as the further procedure, or whether the 15% is a final cap or could possibly be exceeded for certain product categories. However, most economists would say that a universal 15% tariff would cause a setback in economic performance. But that would be a one-off effect that would form the basis for new growth. Within the EU and the eurozone, export-dependent countries such as Germany and Italy are likely to experience the biggest economic slumps. This year and next, the dampening effect of foreign trade will outweigh the tax-financed domestic economic stimulus. So far, we are only seeing the pull-forward effects in the data, especially in Ireland. What we are not yet seeing is a sharp rise in investment, which has followed previous interest rate cut cycles.

Through security on the domestic front: setting priorities, for example, with regard to strategic autonomy or the reduction of bureaucracy – at European level, but this also applies to each country individually, of course. Simply a clear outlook that investing here is worthwhile, more so than elsewhere. In Germany, for example, companies are only making replacement investments. There is no imagination whatsoever for the location, which is partly due to the change of government; people were simply waiting for the new one. Ultimately, it's about the fact that I need confidence in the location despite all the adversities, such as an ageing population, the difficult geopolitical situation and energy insecurity. Every investor needs the confidence that they will receive an appropriate return on their capital investment in the long term.

I believe that we have become too closed off in Europe and are trying to use rules and laws to maintain a level of prosperity in a rapidly changing world that ultimately cannot be maintained with rules and laws. It can only be generated. Of course, this also requires a reliable framework. And this, in turn, is established by rules. But if these become too complicated and I try to codify too much prosperity, then at some point I will lose the basis for it.

It's always a question of relative costs. In mid-2022, the issue of high energy costs came up. As a privately organised company, it is difficult to generate these prices if the global market does not pay for climate-friendly production and, at the same time, climate damage occurs everywhere. From a position of prosperity, Europe has set rules for itself that it would also like to see adopted by other countries, in its role as a pioneer in emissions reduction. However, Europe is very small and thus risks squandering the economic clout that gives it political influence. If climate policy is continued in this way, it is quite possible that global emissions will increase rather than decrease if products are sourced from economic areas where there is far less control over production conditions. This is the paradox that economic policy makers struggle with every day in a globally interconnected environment.

I think we need to take a look at what we actually want to achieve. And it is not clear that this can be achieved directly with emission targets. The goal is understandable and completely comprehensible, but the instruments should be questioned again. One must always be very careful with the individual demands of companies. However, when receiving lobby letters, one should read them carefully and consider whether the people making the demands might have a point.

The share of non-energy-intensive industrial goods in the consumer price index is too small for this channel to cause massive disinflation. However, China exports different goods to the US than to Europe, so the impact on industry is likely to be limited. It also depends on whether there are European competitors for Chinese goods. Sectorally, however, the impact could be concentrated, for example in steel or electric cars. This is because China is a state-controlled market economy with certain overcapacities, for example in steel.

I do believe that there is an awareness of these dependencies. At the same time, however, it is also clear that they cannot be reduced in the short term. Diversification is expensive. And there is always the question of how much pressure there is to react immediately.

By eurozone standards, we have seen relatively strong, robust consumption growth in recent years, based on real income growth. However, this momentum is now slowing down. A revival in consumption would also require a decline in the savings rate. I do not expect this to happen due to the uncertainty caused by the geopolitical situation, US tariffs and concerns about job losses. Historically, however, the unemployment rate is the factor that best explains the savings rate.

Yes, but in the environment we find ourselves in, with a rapidly ageing population and declining employment, the unemployment rate is no longer the right measure.

Employment and how stretched the labour market is. This also includes youth unemployment, the part-time employment rate in Germany and the participation rate in Italy. Or the question of the extent to which the respective activities correspond to the vocational qualifications. In Germany, I would also look at the statutory and effective retirement age.

There are various factors that make a country interesting: a common language or whether there are emigrants from one's own cultural circle living there. A very important factor, and Germany is way ahead in this respect, is the receptiveness of the labour market or how competitive it is perceived to be. The United Kingdom and Spain have a big advantage because of their language. Since we also want immigration through the education system, it would make sense, for example, to pool resources for university funding. We have a great university system, but it is funded on a scattergun basis. It would make more sense to build two or three top universities. However, this is opposed by educational federalism.

We actually need to become more like the United States of Europe, as much as we may not like it, with all the sensitivities that we have here in Europe. For companies operating across borders, the different regulations on consumer protection, data protection or insolvency, for example, mean costs. Ultimately, it is a question of legal certainty, of only having to know one set of rules and not all the specific rules at country level.

Exactly, that's a step in the right direction. However, we have the problem that we have strong constitutional requirements in the countries, which ultimately always remain irrevocable.

The idea makes sense, but you also need the appropriate infrastructure. At the same time, I have to deal with the fragmentation issue, so that companies actually have access to the large European market.

If the Fed cuts rates significantly more now, it will be because of significantly weaker economic momentum. And that would trigger further reflection here in Frankfurt as well. One direct indicator is, of course, the exchange rate.

As a global reserve currency, I need something that can be used directly for transaction purposes, is highly liquid, yields interest and is a safe haven in conflict scenarios. Europe cannot offer this in the foreseeable future. The renminbi would be one possibility. But the euro is a success story.

When answering this question, we must also take into account that there are functioning, privately organised digital payment solutions. So you could say that the product already exists in Europe, just not from a state actor. Whether we need it is therefore a political argument and not a purely economic one.